A supplier emails new bank details shortly before an invoice is due. The message uses a familiar name and the amount matches an approved purchase. For a business group, the request may pass through an administrator, project manager and accounts team, each assuming someone else has checked it. The practical control is a clear verification process that works across those handovers. It should establish who checks the change and how, before the payment instruction is updated.
The Australian Cyber Security Centre’s small business cyber security handbook, published on 7 October 2026, highlights verifying payment requests through a trusted channel. This recent guidance provides the context for the process below. Our discussion focuses on coordinating people and records across business functions. It does not claim that a particular supplier is fraudulent or that following a checklist eliminates the possibility of a loss.
Write the trigger in plain language. A change to an existing supplier’s payment destination should require review even when the invoice itself is familiar. Consider new suppliers and requests to pay a different legal entity as separate cases that also need appropriate checks. Make the trigger visible in the accounts procedure rather than leaving it to individual intuition. A staff member should not have to prove that a message is suspicious before asking for verification.
Clarify what counts as a change. It may arrive through email, an invoice attachment, a portal message or a phone call. An apparently routine update can affect future payments as well as the invoice currently under discussion. The process should identify both consequences. Otherwise a team might verify one payment while accidentally leaving an unverified instruction in the supplier master record.
The person confirming that work was delivered is answering a different question from the person verifying payment details. Both decisions matter. A project manager may know that the invoice is legitimate without knowing whether the bank account is correct. An accounts officer may verify a destination without knowing whether the invoiced work was accepted. Do not allow either approval to stand in for the other without a clear and authorised process.
Create a record with separate fields for the commercial approval and the payment change check. This makes the distinction practical rather than theoretical. It also helps when an approver is absent: a replacement can see which decision remains outstanding. The record need not contain sensitive banking information in every shared project system. Store necessary details within the organisation’s approved financial controls and limit access appropriately.
Use a contact route established independently of the change request. A phone number printed on the new invoice may come from the same source as the unverified bank details. Staff need to know where the trusted supplier contact is recorded and how to handle a missing or outdated record. If no suitable route exists, escalate the request instead of improvising a verification based on another detail in the suspicious message.
During the check, explain that the business is verifying a payment instruction change and follow the approved procedure. Avoid turning a public article into a script that promises a particular security outcome. The objective is independent confirmation through a route the business has reason to trust. Record who performed the check, when it occurred and the result, without copying unnecessary personal information into an open task board.
A real supplier may urgently need payment. Urgency does not remove the need for verification; it changes how quickly the request should reach an authorised decision maker. Give staff a clear escalation contact and a realistic fallback when that person is unavailable. A process that cannot operate during leave or after a project handover will encourage workarounds at exactly the moment it is needed.
Explain the rule to managers as well as administrators. If a senior person routinely instructs staff to skip checks for important suppliers, the written procedure will have little effect. Leaders should support a short verification pause and help resolve genuine operational consequences. The business can communicate respectfully with a supplier while keeping its own controls intact. Verification is an ordinary part of payment administration, not an accusation.
A supplier may invoice several entities or brands in the same group. Determine whether the proposed change applies to one account, one contract or all approved supplier records. Do not propagate it across every entity simply because the supplier name matches. Each affected finance owner should understand the scope and any entity-specific requirements. An accurate change for one relationship can still be wrong when applied elsewhere.
Keep a controlled record of which systems were updated. These might include an accounting platform, purchasing system and approved payment templates. Avoid leaving an old template available for the next payment run. Equally, do not alter unrelated contracts or commercial terms during a banking update. Narrow changes are easier to verify, reverse where appropriate and explain during a later review.
Use an agreed scenario in a training session rather than sending deceptive messages to staff without authorisation. Present a fictional supplier request and ask the team to walk through the steps. Identify where they would find the trusted contact, who would approve the change and how they would record the outcome. Keep real supplier banking details out of the exercise materials.
Observe where the process depends on one person’s memory. A missing contact record or unclear deputy is a useful finding. Assign an owner to fix the gap and repeat the affected step. The exercise should improve the operating process, not simply measure whether staff can identify spelling mistakes in a message. A professionally written request can still require independent verification.
Staff should know how to report an incorrect or suspected fraudulent payment promptly through the business’s incident procedure. The procedure should identify the authorised finance and banking contacts and relevant professional support. Do not promise recovery or delay reporting while trying to prove exactly what happened. Preserve relevant records through approved channels and avoid circulating sensitive material more widely than necessary.
Review the event without replacing evidence with blame. Ask which check was expected, whether it was practical and what information the person had. A missing procedure and a deliberately ignored procedure require different corrective actions. Document the actual weakness and verify the improvement. General reminders to be careful are rarely as useful as clarifying an ambiguous approval step or establishing a reliable contact record.
A good verification process gives people a clear route to complete legitimate work safely. It has a defined trigger, separate decisions, a trusted confirmation channel and an escalation path. Review it when systems, suppliers or responsibilities change. The benefit is stronger payment administration across the group, with fewer assumptions between teams. That benefit should be assessed through evidence of the process operating, without inventing a percentage reduction in fraud or treating a completed checklist as a guarantee.
Contact XGEN; Business continuity and websites; XGEN Group.
Source: https://www.cyber.gov.au/publication/small-business-cyber-security-handbook. Source date/context: 7 October 2026. Reviewed 1 November 2026. The practical framework is our analysis, not a quotation or an endorsement by the source organisation.